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ABSTRACT
We explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty about the length of life and a lack of annuity
markets for life cycle consumption in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which
markets are otherwise complete. Empirical studies find that consumption tends to rise early in life,
peak  around  age  45-55,  and  to  decline  after  that.  Our  calibrated  model  exhibits  life  cycle
consumption that is consistent with this pattern. This follows from the fact that, due to a lack of
annuity markets, households discount the future more heavily as they age and their probability of
survival falls. Once an unfunded social security system is introduced, the profile is still hump shaped,
but the decline in consumption does not begin until after retirement in our base case. Adding a
bequest motive causes this decline to begin at a younger age.
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Among the many sources of uncertainty that an individual faces when plan-
ning for consumption in old age, one of the more signiﬁcant is uncertainty
about how long the individual will live. This source of uncertainty could
be easily insured against if the individual were to purchase an annuity that
provides a constant ﬂow of income until death. But, annuity markets in the
U.S. are quite thin. A standard explanation for the lack of annuity markets
is adverse selection–those with long expected lifetimes will be attracted
to annuities, which might cause them to be unattractively priced for most
people.1
In this paper we explore the quantitative implications of uncertainty
about the length of life and a lack of annuity markets for life cycle con-
sumption in a calibrated general equilibrium overlapping generations model
where markets are otherwise complete. A large literature has documented
that individual household consumption increases early in life, with a peak
sometime around age 45-55 and a decline after that.2 This is generally re-
garded as posing a puzzle for a standard life cycle model of consumption
because, with complete markets, the model implies that consumption should
be smooth over a lifetime. Depending on the relative magnitudes of the
household’s time discount rate and the market interest rate, consumption
can be constant, or monotonically decreasing or increasing as an individual
ages.
If an annuity market (or its equivalent) is unavailable, this intuition
no longer applies. If survival probabilities decrease as an individual ages,
individuals will more heavily discount the future as they grow older. This
allows for the possibility, depending on the value of the interest rate, that
consumption might increase early in life when survival probabilities are high
and the eﬀective rate of discount is low. As survival probabilities fall, the
slope of the consumption proﬁle may become negative.
In addition, because social security provides some insurance against un-
certain lifetimes and may provide an adequate substitute for missing annuity
markets, we also study the shape of the consumption proﬁle in a model with
1See, for example, Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) and Mitchell, Poterba, War-
shawsky, and Brown (1999).
2Thurow (1969) is an early example from this empirical literature. More recent con-
tributions include Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber
(1999), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002). In
addition, a recent paper by Aguiar and Hurst (2004) argues that, while consumption ex-
penditures may be hump shaped, home production is used to smooth actual consumption
relative to expenditures.
2missing annuity markets and a pay-as-you-go social security system as in
the U.S. Social security turns out to matter signiﬁcantly, but life cycle con-
sumption continues to be hump shaped. Introducing a joy of giving bequest
motive also matters quantitatively and decreases the age of the hump in
consumption.
We are not the ﬁrst to note the impact of annuity markets on consump-
tion over the life cycle. Yaari (1965) is perhaps the ﬁrst to study the impact
of uncertain lifetime on the shape of the life cycle consumption proﬁle in an
overlapping generations model. Levhari and Mirman (1977) extend Yaari’s
work by providing results on how risk averse consumers respond to a change
in the distribution of lifetime uncertainty. They obtain results showing how
uncertain lifetimes aﬀect the level of consumption at a particular age, as
opposed to how consumption changes over the course of the life cycle.
Davies (1981) is perhaps the ﬁrst to use a life cycle model with uncertain
lifetimes to interpret actual consumption and savings behavior, in particular
the savings behavior of retired individuals. More recently, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, ˙ Im-
rohoro˘ glu, and Joines (1995) develop an applied general equilibrium model
with long but randomly-lived households to study the welfare eﬀects of social
security reform. They were able to generate age-consumption proﬁles with
a hump by closing annuity markets, though they also had individual income
uncertainty and borrowing constraints. Bütler (2001) provides a continuous-
time overlapping generations model and gives an example of how a lack of
annuity markets can yield a hump-shaped consumption proﬁle. In this pa-
per, our goal is to assess, using a calibrated general equilibrium model with
social security, the extent to which a lack of annuity markets by itself can
account for the observed hump shaped consumption proﬁle.
Most of the consumption literature, however, has explored other factors
that potentially play an important role in determining consumption over the
life cycle. One possibility is that the hump shape may be due to demographic
factors—Attanasio and Browning (1995) and Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and
Weber (1999) argue that the change in the size of a household over time is a
signiﬁcant determinant of the hump in consumption. However, more recent
research has generally found that demographic factors alone cannot account
for the pattern of lifetime consumption.3
Thurow (1969), for example, suggested that the age-consumption proﬁle
may be hump shaped due to borrowing constraints. That is, individuals are
3For example, compare the ﬁndings of Attanasio and Browning (1995) with those of
Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999). The ﬁrst paper concludes that the hump
can be entirely explained by demographic factors while the second ﬁnds an important role
for income uncertainty.
3prevented from shifting as much wealth as they would like from later in life
to ﬁnance consumption earlier. Another possibility is that individuals face
income uncertainty and must die with non-negative assets. This creates a
motive for precautionary savings that could lead to consumption rising with
income early in life. Both Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1999) and
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) emphasize this point. Fernández-Villaverde
and Krueger (2001) argue that households accumulate durables early in life
as a way of insuring against income uncertainty. In their model, the stock of
durables provides insurance by acting as collateral for consumption loans.
In addition, Heckman (1974) and Bullard and Feigenbaum (2003) ex-
plore the possibility that substitutability between consumption and leisure,
rather than market incompleteness, may play an important role. That is, if
preferences are such that consumption and leisure are substitutes, individu-
als may choose to consume more during the periods of their life when they
spend the largest fraction of their time engaged in market work.
The main ﬁnding of our paper is that lack of annuity markets by itself
might provide a quantitatively plausible explanation for actual life cycle
consumption proﬁles when we abstract from social security. Once social
security is introduced, the model displays consumption proﬁles that, while
still hump shaped, are too steep early in life and consumption peaks too
late in life. We then introduce a bequest motive suﬃciently large to account
for the saving behavior of the elderly. We ﬁnd that this feature reverses, to
some extent, the postponement of the hump caused by social security, and
consumption now declines at a younger age.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
surveys some of the empirical literature estimating life cycle consumption
proﬁles. From this we obtain some basic statistics from data that we can
also compute for our model economies. In the third section, we present a
simple partial equilibrium model to provide intuition on how a lack of an-
nuity markets can deliver a hump-shaped consumption proﬁle. A general
equilibrium model, one that incorporates social security, is described in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5 we set up our quantitative exercise and present results in
Section 6. A bequest motive is introduced and its quantitative implications
are studied in Section 7. Section 8 provides some concluding remarks.
42 Empirical Consumption Proﬁle
Both Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger
(2002) have estimated life cycle consumption proﬁles using data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey. Both ﬁnd that consumption rises early in
life, peaks sometime between age 45 and 55, and declines after that. This
work is useful for our purposes because their estimation procedure controls
for family composition and cohort (growth) eﬀects. We abstract from the
ﬁrst in our theoretical analysis, and, although we incorporate technological
progress in our model, we also correct for growth in computing our theoret-
ical consumption proﬁles.
Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) obtain the proﬁle for non-
durable consumption expenditures of an adult equivalent for ages 22 through
87 shown in Figure 1.













Figure 4.1.5 from "Consumption over
the Life Cycle: Some Facts from
Consumer Expenditure Survey Data,"
by Jesus Fernadez−Villaverde and
Dirk Krueger.
Figure 1. Nondurable Consumption over the Life Cycle
5According to their estimates, consumption peaks at age 52 and the ra-
tio of consumption at this maximum to consumption at age 25 is equal to
1.29. We use these numbers as data benchmarks with which to compare our
model results. Gourinchas and Parker (2002), using a broader deﬁnition of
consumption, compute a consumption proﬁle for ages 26 through 65. They
ﬁnd that consumption peaks near age 45 and the ratio of peak consumption
to age 25 consumption is close to 1.12.
3 A Simple Partial Equilibrium Model
To clarify why a lack of annuity markets can lead to a hump shaped lifetime
consumption proﬁle we ﬁrst study a very simple endowment economy. Each
period one agent is born that lives a maximum of I periods. Assume that
the lifetime endowment pattern is given by
yi =
 
1 for i < IM
0 for i ≥ IM
,
where IM is the mandatory retirement age. That is, individuals receive
one unit of income in each period until they retire, at which point they
must ﬁnance consumption with accumulated savings. A new born in this
















ci + Λiai+1 = R(ai + b) + yi, i = 1,2,...,I,
a1 = 0.
Here ci is consumption of an age-i individual, ai is asset holdings, yi is
endowment income, and sj is the conditional probability of surviving from
age j to age j + 1. Non-annuitized assets of individuals who die in a given
period are distributed to all living individuals as a lump sum transfer b. The
interest factor, R, is taken parametrically in this partial equilibrium model.
We allow for zero, partial or complete annuitization of wealth by assum-
ing a value for λ ∈ [0,1], which is the fraction of assets that are annuitized.
For a given value of λ, the savings required of an individual who would like
6ai+1 assets available at the beginning of the following period is Λiai+1, where
Λi = 1 − λ(1 − si). This implies that
Λiai+1 = λsiai+1 + (1 − λ)ai+1.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of this expression is savings in the form
of annuitized assets and the second term is savings in the form of assets that
are not annuitized. Note that si is the actuarially fair price for a one period
annuity sold to an individual of age i. If λ = 1, then there are complete
annuity markets. As long as λ < 1, there will be unintended bequests b.
















Given values for the model parameters and the interest rate R, it is
straight forward to solve for the lifetime consumption path that would be
chosen by individuals in this economy. To calibrate reasonable survival
probabilities, we assume that individuals start their economic life at age 21
(corresponds to i = 1) and live to a maximum age of 100 (I = 80). They
retire at age 65 (IM = 45). We use survival probabilities published by the
Social Security Administration for the cohort born in 1950. In addition, we
assume log utility, which corresponds to γ = 1. In this case, the life cycle
consumption-saving decision is determined by a sequence of Euler equations







where the right hand side reduces to βsjR in the absence of annuity markets
and to βR when all assets are annuitized.
We are interested in determining how the consumption proﬁle depends on
the value of λ and the value of the interest factor R relative to the subjective
discount factor β. Assuming β = 0.96, we ﬁrst consider a value of R such
that βR = 1. Figure 2 shows the consumption proﬁle in this case for three
values of λ: 0, 0.3, and 1. One can see that, if there are perfect annuity
markets, consumption will be constant over the individual’s lifetime, which
is also clear from the Euler equation, as the right hand side equals one in this
case. If there are no annuities available, individual consumption is declining
7over time. The intuition for this is that individuals, because they face a
probability of not surviving to enjoy the fruits of their savings, discount the
future more heavily than if actuarially fair annuities are available. This
ﬁnding is robust to allowing individuals to hold a substantial amount of
their saving in the form of annuities (λ = 0.3).














30% Annuities Perfect Annuities
β  R = 1
Figure 2. Consumption Proﬁles
If the consumption proﬁle is to be hump shaped, consumption must
increase early in life. To illustrate this, we choose R so that βR = 1.02. In
this case, consumption would rise throughout life if individuals have access
to perfect annuity markets. This is because the price of the annuity, which
is falling as an individual ages, compensates for the increasing eﬀective rate
of discount due to survival probabilities falling as an individual ages.















Figure 3. Subjective and Market Discount Factors
A lack of annuity markets, however, means that individuals are not com-
pensated for their increasing eﬀective rate of discount and consumption may
decline in the later stages of life. This happens when an individual’s ef-
fective rate of discount is larger than the interest rate. Figure 3 shows
the period-by-period trade-oﬀ that the individual faces in his consumption-
saving choice for β = 0.96 and R = 1.02/β. As long as the market discount
factor given by the gross real interest rate exceeds the subjective discount
factor adjusted for the conditional survival probability of that age, consump-
tion grows. Once the reverse is true, consumption has reached its peak and
starts to decline.
Figure 4 illustrates consumption proﬁles when there are perfect annuity
markets, when there are no annuities, and when 30% of assets is annuitized.














Figure 4. Consumption Proﬁles
4 A General Equilibrium Model
In this section, we will describe a fully calibrated general equilibrium life cy-
cle model of the sort studied by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu,
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Joines (1995), Ríos-Rull (1996), and Fernández-Villaverde
and Krueger (2001), among others.
4.1 The Environment and Demographics
We use a stationary overlapping generations setup. At each date t, a new
generation of individuals is born and the population growth rate is η. Indi-
viduals face long but random lives with a maximum possible age I. Lifespan
uncertainty is described by si, the conditional probability of surviving from
age i to i + 1. We assume a stationary population by making the survival
10probabilities and the population growth rate time-invariant.4 Total popula-







where Nt denotes the number of individuals born in period t. Given that we
assume stationary demographics, the fraction of the total population that
is of age i is constant over time. These cohort shares, { i}I








 i = 1.
4.2 Technology




where Kt and Ht are aggregate capital and labor inputs, respectively, and α
is capital’s output share. There is exogenous labor-augmenting technological
growth at the rate g > 0 :
At+1 = (1 + g)At. (3)
The capital stock depreciates at the rate δ and follows the law of motion
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Xt, (4)
where Xt is aggregate investment in period t.
4.3 Households
Individuals diﬀer by their date of retirement. There are M possible retire-
ment dates (Im for m = 1,...,M) and individuals know the date of their
4For studies that examine the quantitative impact of time-variation in either demo-
graphic variable on social security reform, see Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters and Walliser (1999) and
De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu and Sargent (1999), among others.
11retirement at birth. The fraction of individuals with retirement date Im is
denoted by πm.




















ci,m,t+i−1 + Λiai+1,m,t+i = Rt+i−1(ai,m,t+i−1 + bt+i−1) (6)
+(1 − τs)wt+i−1εihi,m,t+i−1 + Si,m,t+i−1,
where β is the subjective discount factor, Rt+i−1 is the interest rate factor,
τs is the social security payroll tax, Si,m,t+i−1 is the social security beneﬁt
paid to an individual of age i and type m, ai+1,m,t+i is the amount of assets
to be available at age i + 1, εi is the eﬃciency weight of an individual at
age i, and hi,m,t+i−1 is hours supplied by an age-i individual of type m
at time t + i − 1. As in Section 3, we use λ ∈ [0,1] to indicate the degree
of completeness of private annuity markets, and Λi = 1 − λ(1 − si). We
assume that accidental bequests, if they exist, are returned to all surviving
individuals, regardless of age, in a lump sum denoted by bt+i−1.
Finally, we assume that all individuals are born with zero wealth and
will exhaust all accumulated wealth at the maximum achievable age I, so
that a1,m,t = aI+1,m,t+I = 0 for all m and t.
4.4 Social Security
There is an unfunded social security system in our economy. Beneﬁts are
linked to average lifetime earnings in a manner consistent with the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) computation. An individual born at date




where Im is the retirement age for this individual and t+Im −1 is the date
of retirement. To obtain the indexed annual income (similar to the notion
of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings calculated by the SSA), we need to
multiply past earnings up to the time of retirement by a ‘productivity factor’,
with earnings that are in the more distant past getting a higher factor. For
12an individual who retires at age Im at date t+Im−1, past earnings are scaled
up so that the most recent income before retirement (at date t + Im − 2)
is multiplied by (1 + g)0, income from the period preceding that one is
multiplied by (1 + g)1, and so on, until the ﬁrst working age income for
this individual, wtε1h1,m,t, is multiplied by (1 + g)Im−2. Therefore, for an
individual who retires at time t + Im, total indexed labor income over the




Retirement beneﬁts for an age i individual who retires at age Im in date
t+i−1 is a fraction θm of average lifetime indexed income (the replacement





j=1 wt+j−1(1 + g)Im−1−jεjhj,m,t+j−1 for i ≥ Im
0 for i < Im
.














to endogenously calculate the social security tax rate. In this formula,
{πm}M
m=1 is the fraction of individuals who retire at age Im.
4.5 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium with stationary demographics consists of a social
security tax rate τs, and sequences indexed by t for unintended bequests bt,
household allocations {{ci,m,t,ai+1,m,t+1,hi,m,t}I
i=1}M
m=1, factor demands Kt
and Ht, and factor prices wt and Rt such that
1. The household allocation solves the individuals’ maximization prob-
lem.
2. Factor demands solve the stand-in ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem,
which implies that












+ 1 − δ.
133. Aggregate quantities are obtained as weighted averages of optimal






















 i(1 − si)(1 − λ)ai+1,m,t
1 + η
.












We study the quantitative properties of the balanced growth path of the
model described in the previous section. In this section, we describe how we
solve for the balanced growth path and the calibration of the model.
5.1 Solving for the Steady State Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium deﬁned above has the property that ci,m,t,
ai,m,t, Si,m,t, Kt, and wt, for all i and m, grow at the constant rate of
technological progress, g. For each variable Zt deﬁne




Also, let   β = β(1+g)φ(1−γ). Then, we can ﬁnd the time-invariant quantities
{{  ci,m, hi,m,   ai+1,m,   Si,m}I
i=1}M
m=1,   K, H,   b, and prices   w and R by solving
the following set of equations:
1. A set of ﬁrst order conditions for work eﬀort for i = 1,2,...,Im − 1
14and m = 1,2,...,M :
φ  c
φ(1−γ)−1















= (1 − φ)  c
φ(1−γ)
j,m (1 − hi,m)(1−φ)(1−γ)−1,
where the second term on the left hand side accounts for the eﬀect of
current work eﬀort decision on future retirement beneﬁts.
2. A set of intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions for i = 1,2,...,I −1 and
m = 1,2,...,M :
  c
φ(1−γ)−1
i,m (1+g)Λi(1−hi,m)(1−φ)(1−γ) = R  βsi  c
φ(1−γ)−1
i+1,m (1−hi+1,m)(1−φ)(1−γ),
[note that hi,m = 0 for i ≥ Im].
3. A set of budget constraints,
(a) for i = 1,2,...,Im − 1 and m = 1,2,...,M :
  ci,m + (1 + g)Λi  ai+1,m = R(  ai,m +  b) + (1 − τs)  wεihi,m,
(b) for i = Im,Im + 1,...,I and m = 1,2,...,M :








  aI+1,m = 0.
5.
  a1,m = 0.
6.






































+ 1 − δ.
5.2 Calibration
Individuals in our economy are assumed to begin their economic life at age
21 (that is, i = 1 corresponds to age 21) and live until a maximum age
of 100 (i = 80). The conditional survival probabilities from age i to age
i + 1, {si}I
i=1, are taken from estimates provided by the Social Security
Administration (SSA) for a cohort born in 1950 [see Bell and Miller (2002)].
The population growth rate, η, is assumed to be 1.2 percent per year. The
age speciﬁc eﬃciency weights for labor hours, {εi}I
i=1, are based on estimates
from Hansen (1993).
Retirement can occur at M = 9 possible ages, which correspond to ages
62-70 (Im ∈ {42,43,...,50})5. The fraction of individuals that retire and
begin collecting social security at age Im, πm, was obtained from the SSA.6
In addition, we calculated the age adjusted social security replacement rate,
θm, from SSA data on beneﬁts as a percentage of the Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA) by the age at which beneﬁts begin.7 In particular, we chose
5In our model, the retirement age is the exogenously determined age at which indi-
viduals begin collecting social security and also stop working. In the U.S. economy, these
two events do not need to coincide. French (2004) studies a life cycle model where labor
participation and the date at which social security payments begin are separate decisions
made by utility maximizing individuals.
6Age 62 is the ﬁrst age at which individuals are eligible to collect social security. By
delaying, an individual will receive higher payments (θm increases with m), but there is no
incentive to delay beyond age 70. Hence, the fraction of individuals that begin collecting
social security after age 70 is trivial. The values we used for {πm}
M
m=1 were obtained
directly from Social Security Administration and are similar to numbers found in Table
6B5 of the 2004 Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Administration.
7These data can be found at the following web site:
www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/ar_drc.html.
16{θm}M
m=1 to be consistent with these beneﬁt percentages, the fraction of
individuals that retire at these ages, and the U.S. average social security
replacement rate of 0.45.
Since the primary focus of this paper is on the role of annuities, as
opposed to the role of nonseparable utility studied in Bullard and Feigen-
baum (2003), we choose the risk aversion parameter, γ, equal to one in our
benchmark calibration. That is, the period utility function is separable,
U(ci,hi) = φlogci + (1 − φ)log(1 − hi).
The remaining parameters of preferences and technology are chosen so
that our model is consistent with various facts characterizing the U.S. macro-
economy. The growth rate of labor augmenting technological progress, g, is
chosen so that our model is consistent with the measured growth rate of real
per capita income. Given this and the average capital output (K/Y = 3.32)
and investment output (X/Y = 0.25) ratios measured from U.S. data, we




− g − η − gη.
The capital share parameter, α, is set equal to 0.36, which is consistent
with measures of capital’s share from NIPA data. Finally, the preference
parameters β and φ are chosen to target the capital-output ratio and the
fraction of time spent on market activities (taken to be 0.31).
Table 1 summarizes our calibration.
Table 1. Benchmark Calibration
Demographics
ﬁrst age i = 1 21
maximum age I = 80 100
population growth rate η 0.012
conditional survival probabilities {si}I




capital share parameter α 0.36
depreciation rate δ 0.047
productivity growth rate g 0.0165
Preferences
subjective discount factor β 0.9726
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ 1.0
share of consumption φ 0.368
17Social Security Parameters (ΣM
m=1θm/M = 0.45)
Im 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
πm 0.46 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05
θm 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.65
In alternative calibrations, we explore the relative impact of nonseparable
utility in addition to lack of annuity markets on the shape of the consumption
proﬁle. Hence, we also consider cases where γ = 4 and γ = 7. This requires
re-calibrating the parameters β and φ in order to hit our targets. Table 2
summarizes the values used in these alternative calibrations.
Table 2. Alternative Calibrations
β φ
γ = 1 0.9726 0.368
γ = 4 1.0127 0.380
γ = 7 1.0545 0.386
6 Results
Here we describe consumption proﬁles for three model economies. The ﬁrst
is one with complete annuity markets and no social security. The second has
no annuity markets and still no social security. The third case, the one used
for calibration in section 6.1, adds social security, which serves as a partial
substitute for the missing annuity markets.
In each case, we consider three values for the risk aversion parameter,
γ = 1, 4, and 7. The γ = 1 case is one in which the utility function is sepa-
rable between consumption and leisure, so leisure (retirement, in particular)
has no eﬀect on the marginal utility of consumption. The other two cases
involve non-separable utility, so changes over the life cycle in the amount of
time individuals spend working will also aﬀect the shape of the consumption
proﬁle.8 A summary of our quantitative ﬁndings is contained in Table 3.
8The eﬀect of this non-separability on consumption proﬁles is studied in Heckman
(1974) and Bullard and Feigenbaum (2003).
18Table 3. Quantitative Findings
θ τs X/Y K/Y R H S1 S2
DATA 0.45 0.10 0.25 3.32 0.310 52 1.29
Case 1 No Social Security and Perfect Annuities
γ = 1 0.0 0.0 0.280 3.718 1.050 0.310 NA 1.34
γ = 4 0.0 0.0 0.300 3.979 1.044 0.318 59 1.34
γ = 7 0.0 0.0 0.309 4.103 1.041 0.323 59 1.39
Case 2 No Social Security and No Annuities
γ = 1 0.0 0.0 0.269 3.573 1.054 0.297 60 1.21
γ = 4 0.0 0.0 0.311 4.131 1.041 0.311 57 1.28
γ = 7 0.0 0.0 0.355 4.719 1.030 0.327 57 1.30
Case 3 Social Security and No Annuities
γ = 1 0.45 0.107 0.25 3.32 1.062 0.310 67 1.61
γ = 4 0.45 0.107 0.25 3.32 1.062 0.310 61 1.60
γ = 7 0.45 0.107 0.25 3.32 1.062 0.310 61 1.59
Note: NA : the ratio is still rising at maximum attainable age.
S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum.
S2 is the ratio of maximum consumption to consumption at age 25
Table 3 reports various statistics including the three that were used to
calibrate the model in section 6.1: the investment-output ratio, the capital-
output ratio, and the average fraction of time spent working. Since we
calibrated the model under the assumptions of Case 3 (social security and
no annuities), the results hit our targets exactly in this case.9 In addition,
we report the social security tax rate, the steady state interest rate, the
age at which consumption reaches its maximum, and the ratio of maximum
consumption to age 25 consumption.10
9Note that, as shown in Table 2, we have diﬀerent calibrated parameters depending on
the value of γ.
10Note that the social security tax rate that maintains the pay as you go system in Case
3 is close to the actual social security tax rate of about 10%.














Figure 5. No Social Security and Perfect Annuities
Figure 5 shows the consumption proﬁles for our economy with complete
annuity markets and no social security, along with the consumption pro-
ﬁle estimated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey shown in Figure 1.
Consumption from the model economies has been normalized so that the life
cycle proﬁle has the same mean as the one estimated from actual data. Given
perfect annuity markets, consumption proﬁles are hump shaped only when
utility is non-separable. Consumption monotonically increases throughout
life in the γ = 1 case. In the other two proﬁles shown, consumption peaks
at about age 59 and then rises again after retirement (consumption peaks
at age 52 in the data). This is very much inconsistent with what is observed
in actual data.















Figure 6. No Social Security and No Annuity Markets
When annuity markets are shut down, all consumption proﬁles have a
hump shape (see Figure 6). The intuition for why a hump is observed in
the γ = 1 case is the same as was discussed in section 3; the eﬀective rate
of discount that combines the subjective rate of discount and the uncondi-
tional probability of survival eventually exceeds the market rate of discount
measured by the interest rate. Although consumption peaks a bit later than
in the data, we view these results as indicating that lack of annuity markets
is a quantitatively plausible explanation for the shape of the consumption
proﬁles estimated from actual data. This conclusion is reinforced by our
robustness experiments that we describe in section 7.1.















Figure 7. Social Security and No Annuity Markets
Once social security is introduced, consumption peaks later and the ratio
of maximum consumption to age 25 consumption is too large. This can be
seen both in Table 3 and in Figure 7. In the ﬁgure, we also see an upward
sloping proﬁle after retirement (except for the γ = 1 case) that we do not
see in actual data.
It is also the case, however, that the interest rate for Case 3 is quite a
bit higher than the interest rates obtained in our experiments without social
security. To see if this higher interest rate, rather than the partial annuity
provided by social security, is responsible for our ﬁndings, we re-calibrated
the parameters in Case 2 to hit the targets deﬁned in section 6.1. This
implies an interest rate that is the same as in Case 3. We ﬁnd consumption
proﬁles that are essentially identical to those reported on for Case 2 in Table
3 and Figure 6. Hence, it is not the higher interest rate that is driving the
diﬀerences in the results obtained for Cases 2 and 3 in Table 3.










Figure 8. Hours Proﬁle, Social Security and No Annuity Markets
Our model also has implications for the life cycle proﬁle of hours worked.
It turns out that the hours proﬁles are very similar in all the cases consid-
ered, so we only show the proﬁles for the economy with no annuity markets
and social security in Figure 8. These proﬁles are almost completely deter-
mined by the eﬃciency weights and by our retirement assumptions. Annuity
markets, or lack thereof, have essentially no impact on the shape the hours
proﬁle.
6.1 Robustness
In order to assess the robustness of our results on the lack of annuity markets,
we have solved the model for a wide range of plausible parameter values,
both with and without social security. In particular, we have considered all
possible combinations of the parameter values shown in Table 4.
23Table 4. Parameter Space for Robustness Check
Parameter Min Value Max Value Increment
γ 1 4 3
β 0.98 1.02 0.01
δ 0.03 0.09 0.02
α 0.30 0.40 0.02
φ 0.30 0.40 0.02
In Table 5 we summarize our ﬁndings regarding the shape of the steady
state life cycle consumption proﬁle. We report the minimum and maximum
values for the two key statistics across all parameterizations considered. The
two statistics are the age at which consumption is at its maximum (S1) and
the ratio of maximum consumption to consumption at age 25 (S2).
Table 5. Results of Robustness Check
Case minS1 maxS1 minS2 maxS2
Social Security, γ = 1 60 74 1.21 2.74
Social Security, γ = 4 57 61 1.33 1.78
No Social Security, γ = 1 22 70 1 1.99
No Social Security, γ = 4 37 60 1.09 1.49
Data S1 = 52 S2 = 1.29
S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum.
S2 is the ratio of maximum consumption to consumption at age 25.
This exercise reinforces the ﬁndings from our calibrated model. If one
ignores the existence of social security, a life cycle model with no annuity
markets appears to account for the key quantitative properties of consump-
tion over the life cycle. However, once social security is introduced, con-
sumption is predicted to peak too late in life and the size of the hump in
consumption is too large.
7 Bequests
The results of the previous section indicate that, even after introducing
social security, a lack of annuity markets implies that consumption will be
hump shaped over the life cycle. However, consumption appears to peak
quite a bit later than empirical studies have found.
Another problem with these results is that older households are not
saving as much (holding as many assets) as they do in the data. For example,
24for the case in Table 3 with social security and no annuities (γ = 1), the
ratio of assets held by individuals age 75 and older to average wealth is 0.69.
But according to the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, this
ratio is around 1.75.11 Clearly, our model is inconsistent with the saving
behavior of older households.12
There are a variety of reasons why older households might save more than
they do in our model economy. While we have taken into account uncertainty
about longevity, we have not taken into account uncertainty about medical
expenditures or that individuals may care about their descendants. In this
section, we will introduce a “joy of giving” bequest motive in order to give
older households an additional motive to save.
To see how this might aﬀect consumption over the life cycle, suppose










{si−1U(ci) + (1 − si−1)V (ai)},
where U and V are increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable functions. The
function V captures the bequest motive. The intertemporal ﬁrst order con-
dition can be written,
U′(ci) = β
 
siRU′(ci+1) + (1 − si)V ′(ai+1)
 
. (7)
If V ′(a) = 0, the slope of the consumption proﬁle depends on the value of
si relative to βR (see discussion in section 3). If V ′(a) > 0, then there is an
additional value of saving that will cause households to delay consumption
(the consumption proﬁle will have a positive slope) even for a range of
values of si that are less than 1/(Rβ). Hence, for a given interest factor and
sequence of survival probabilities, it would appear that the introduction of
a bequest motive will delay the peak of the life cycle consumption proﬁle.
Since the puzzle remaining from section 6 is that consumption in our model
peaks too late in life, it would appear that a bequest motive is not going to
help us resolve this anomaly.
11See Table 702. These wealth ratios are computed using data from the Survey of
Consumer Finance.
12This ratio is sensitive to the timing of bequests. In the experiments report on in Table
3, bequests, which are all accidental, are paid in lump sum fashion to all living households.
If we assumed that bequests are paid uniformly only to individuals of age 52-58, which
are the ages most individuals receive bequests in the U.S., the ratio of assets held by
individuals age 75 and older to average wealth is 0.87 rather than 0.69.
25However, ours is a general equilibrium model. The interest rate is not
exogenous and will fall if we hold all other parameters constant and introduce
a bequest motive that increases savings and, hence, the capital stock. The
general equilibrium eﬀect comes from a reduction in the interest factor as
the capital stock increases with a more intense bequest motive.
In our numerical exercise, we calibrate the model by choosing β to deliver
a particular capital-output ratio. With a bequest motive, we will require
a smaller value of β to achieve our target. Hence, the condition si <
1/(βR) will be satisﬁed at an earlier age since survival probabilities fall as an
individual ages. Whether or not this general equilibrium eﬀect dominates the
eﬀect described above can only be determined through a numerical exercise.
We describe this exercise and the results obtained in the next subsection.
7.1 A Simpliﬁed Model with a Bequest Motive
We will consider a simpliﬁed version of our model in order to understand
the role of bequests in aﬀecting the consumption proﬁle. In particular,
we restrict our attention to log utility, one retirement type, and exogenous
labor. We assume there are no annuity markets. We use a ‘joy of giving’











{si−1 log(  ci) + (1 − si−1)ψlog(  ai+1)}
subject to
  ci + (1 + g)  ai+1 = R(  ai +  bi) + (1 − τs)  wεihi +   Si,
where ψ > 0 is a parameter that represents the intensity of the ‘bequest’
motive. Conditional on survival, individuals begin collecting social security
beneﬁts at age IR:
  Si =
 
0 for i = 1,2,...,IR − 1,
θ
IR−1(1 + g)IR−i−1  IR−1
j=1   wεjhj for i = IR,IR+1,...,I,
13The inclusion of a bequest motive presents computational diﬃculties in characterizing
steady-state equilibria especially when the bequest motive is very strong. To deal with
this problem, we simpliﬁed the model in all the dimensions that we could but retained the
crucial features.
26and the social security tax rate is computed as
τs =
 I
i=IR  i  Si
 IR−1
i=1  i   wεihi
.
Factor prices are given the same as in Section 5. We will present our
ﬁndings for two cases, without and with social security. In both cases, we
set n = 0.012, g = 0.0165, and α = 0.36 as before, and target K/Y = 3.32
and I/Y = 0.25 (which together imply δ = 0.0466 as before). We calibrate
the bequest motive (φ) so that the ratio of assets held by households aged 75
and older to the total capital stock is equal to 1.78. Also, we assume that
both accidental and intentional bequests are received as lump sum transfers
to all households between ages 52 and 58.
7.2 Results without Social Security
In the case with no social security, we set β = 0.9562 and ψ = 5 to hit our
calibration targets. Table 6 below reports our ﬁndings.14
14We do not report the numerical results from a partial equilibrium analysis that con-
ﬁrms the intuition presented in the text. Intensifying the bequest motive in this case (i.e.,
raising ψ) has only one eﬀect: as V
′ increases, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of
equation (7) remains constant, and therefore a more intense bequest motive postpones the
age of the hump in consumption. For example, raising ψfrom a value of 2 to 5 pushes the
age of the hump from 47 to 54.
27Table 6. Timing of the Hump: No Social Security
(calibrated with ψ = 0)
ψ R K/Y S1 S2 S3
0 1.0619 3.32 64 1.34 1.42
(calibrated to S3)
ψ R K/Y S1 S2 S3
0 1.0762 2.93 65 1.41 1.59
1 1.0711 3.06 61 1.43 1.55
2 1.0686 3.12 59 1.42 1.61
3 1.0663 3.19 56 1.41 1.68
4 1.0640 3.25 55 1.41 1.73
5 1.0619 3.32 54 1.40 1.78
10 1.0525 3.63 53 1.40 1.93
15 1.0451 3.93 53 1.39 2.00
S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum.
S2 is the ratio of maximum consumption to consumption at age 25.
S3 is the share of wealth held by households aged 75 and older.
The ﬁrst row of Table 6 shows results when the model is calibrated
without bequests (ψ = 0). This case is analogous to the case shown in Table 3
for Case 2, γ = 1 and diﬀers from this case only because of the simpliﬁcations
we have made to the model and the diﬀerent timing of accidental bequests.
Once the bequest motive is introduced and we calibrate ψ to target S3 = 1.78
(ψ = 5), we ﬁnd that the age of peak consumption (S1) falls from 64 to
54. Clearly, the general equilibrium eﬀect dominates the partial equilibrium
eﬀect.
The remaining lines of Table 6 show that, if all other parameters are held
constant, increasing ψ increases the capital-output ratio and the fraction
of the capital stock held by the elderly, and decreases the interest factor.
Increasing ψ also reduces the age at which consumption peaks and little
eﬀect on the size of the hump (S2).
7.3 Results with Social Security
We now introduce partial annuities in the form of social security. Setting the
replacement rate θ = 0.45, a subjective discount rate of β = 0.9672 and an
intensity of bequest ψ = 3.80 allow us to obtain K/Y = 3.32 and S3 = 1.78.
Table 7 reports the quantitative general equilibrium ﬁndings.
28Table 7. Timing of the Hump: With Social Security
(calibrated with ψ = 0)
ψ R K/Y S1 S2 S3
0 1.0619 3.32 70 1.90 1.02
(calibrated to S3 = 1.78)
ψ R K/Y S1 S2 S3
0 1.0715 3.05 70 1.90 1.11
1 1.0682 3.14 69 1.81 1.37
2 1.0658 3.20 69 1.76 1.54
3 1.0636 3.27 69 1.71 1.69
3.8 1.0619 3.32 68 1.68 1.78
5 1.0592 3.40 67 1.64 1.90
8 1.0532 3.61 60 1.57 2.12
10 1.0496 3.74 57 1.55 2.20
15 1.0418 4.07 55 1.52 2.32
S1 is the age at which life cycle consumption attains its maximum.
S2 is the ratio of maximum consumption to consumption at age 25.
S3 is the share of wealth held by households aged 75 and older.
As in Table 3, the results shown in the ﬁrst row of Table 7 indicate
that once social security is introduced, consumption peaks at a later age
(70 as opposed to 64) when there is no bequest motive. The introduction
of a bequest motive calibrated to S3 = 1.78, however, does not have much
of an eﬀect on the age at which consumption peaks (68 as opposed to 70).
In this sense, the results with social security are very diﬀerent from those
without social security (Table 6) where the peak age fell signiﬁcantly with
the introduction of a bequest motive. But, introducing a bequest motive
does not appear to overturn our main ﬁndings from Section 7, that the
partial annuity provided by social security causes the peak in consumption
to appear too late in the life cycle relative to empirical ﬁndings. This
conclusion could, however, be reversed with a stronger bequest motive and
a much larger share of wealth being held by households aged 75 or older.15
15One could argue that an S3 = 1.78 is too low on the gounds that this ratio does not take
into account the smaller household size in older households. Using a typical equivalence
scale to adjust the family size in households that are 75 and above, S3 becomes 2.50.
Keeping α = 0.36 and θ = 0.45, the (new) joint targets of K/Y = 3.32 and S3 = 2.50
are obtained with β = 0.9487 and ψ = 12. Now, the hump occurs at age 56 and S2 is 1.67.
So we need a strong preference for bequests and high asset holdings by the elderly to get
the hump in the presence of social security.
298 Concluding Remarks
The empirical life cycle consumption proﬁle in the U.S. is a hump that peaks
around age 50. This is typically considered a puzzle since the complete mar-
kets life cycle model would produce a consumption proﬁle that is monotonic
over the life cycle. In this paper we explore the quantitative implications of
uncertainty about the length of life and a lack of annuity markets for life
cycle consumption in a calibrated general equilibrium life cycle model where
markets are otherwise complete.
If an annuity market (or a partial substitute) is unavailable, then the
decline in the survival probabilities over the life cycle as an individual ages
leads to a heavier discounting of the future as they grow older. This allows
for the possibility, depending on the value of the interest rate, that con-
sumption might increase early in life when survival probabilities are high
and the eﬀective rate of discount is low. As survival probabilities fall, the
slope of the consumption proﬁle may become negative.
In addition, because social security provides some insurance against un-
certain lifetimes and therefore may provide an adequate substitute for miss-
ing annuity markets, we also study the shape of the consumption proﬁle in
a model with missing annuity markets and a pay-as-you-go social security
system as in the U.S. Social security turns out to matter signiﬁcantly.
The main ﬁnding of our paper is that lack of annuity markets by it-
self may provide a quantitatively plausible explanation for actual life cycle
consumption proﬁles when we abstract from social security. Once social se-
curity is introduced, the model displays consumption proﬁles that are too
steep and where consumption peaks too late in life. We ﬁnd that these
conclusions are robust to the introduction of a bequest motive calibrated to
account for the fraction of wealth held by the elderly.
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